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This paper shows how problems in ‘non life’-insurance and ‘non life’-reinsurance
can be modelled simultaneouslyas cooperative games with stochasticpayoffs. Pareto
optimal allocations of the risks faced by the insurers and the insureds are determined.
Itisshownthatthecoreofthecorrespondinginsurancegamesisnonempty. Moreover,
it is shown that speciﬁc core allocationsare obtained when the zero utilityprincipleis
used for calculating premiums. Finally, game theory is used to give a justiﬁcationfor
subadditivepremiums.
KEYWORDS: (re)insurance, zero utility principle, cooperative game theory, Pareto
optimality, core.
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1 Introduction
Classical actuarial theory has mainly focused on insurance problems from the insurer’s
point of view. Most of the attention is dedicated to the determination of an appropriate
premium for the insured risk. Obviously, the nature of the risk is a substantial factor in
this process. In this respect, there is an important difference whether the risk arises from
the ‘life’ or the ‘non life’ sector. For the ﬁrst, there is a profusion of statistical data on the
expected remaining life available, which makes the calculation of an appropriate premium
relatively easy. For the latter, however, things are a bit more complicated. In ‘non life’
insurancetheriskisnotalwayseasytocaptureinastatistical framework. Therefore,several
premium calculation principles have been developed to serve this purpose, see for instance
Goovaerts, De Vylder and Haezendonck (1984).
These calculation principles, however, only take into account a part of the insurer’s
side of the deal. More precisely, they consider whether the premium is high enough to
cover the risk. Competition arising from the presence of other insurers on the one hand,
and the interests of the insured, on the other hand, are at least to a large extent ignored. It
is, of course, better to consider all these aspects in an insurance deal, since the premium
should not only be high enough to compensate the insurer for bearing the individual’s risk,
it should also be lowenough so that an individualis willing to insurehis risk (or apart of it)
for this premium. The economic models for (re)insurance markets, which were developed
from the 1960’s on (cf. Borch (1962a) and B¨ uhlmann (1980), (1984)), consider indeed the
interests of both the insurers and the insureds. These models incorporate the possibility to
study problems concerning fairness, Pareto optimality and market equilibrium. B¨ uhlmann
(1980),forexample, shows thattheEsscher calculation principleresultsin aPareto optimal
outcome.
More recently, also game theory is used to model the interests of all parties in an
insurance problem. Cooperative game theory focuses on the gains arising in multi person
interactive decision situations when a part of the population decides to cooperate. The
primary concerns are which coalitions ultimately form and how to divide the gains among
themembersofeach coalition formed. Thistheoryﬁndsmany applicationsin, forexample,3
cost allocation (cf. Moulin (1988)) and combinatorial optimization problems (cf Tijs
(1992)). Cost allocation problems arise when several groups of people with possibly
differentinterests areinvolvedin ajoint project. The problemisthen who payswhat part of
thetotalcosts. Awellknownexampleofsuch aproblemwasfacedbytheTennessee Valley
Authority in the US during the 1930’s. Brieﬂy spoken, this project was designed to control
the course of the Tennessee river. The problem was how the costs should be allocated
to the groups that beneﬁted from the project (see Ransmeier (1942)). In combinatorial
optimization one can think of the construction of a network to connect households to an
electrical powerplant such that everybody is supplied with electricity. Problems that arise
here are which network to construct and how to allocate the costs of it.
Besides the applications just mentioned, cooperative game theory has been applied
in insurance problems. Especially when insurance companies incorporate subadditive
premiums, individualscan save on thepremiumif they decideto takeacollectiveinsurance
instead of an individual one. This situation is discussed in Alegre and Merc` e Claramunt
(1995). Other applications of cooperative game theory in insurance can be found in Borch
(1962b) and Lemaire (1991).
Cooperative game theory, however, still has to establish itself as an appropriate tool
for exploring insurance problems. A reason for this is due to the inability of traditional
cooperative game theory to incorporate the uncertainties, which play such an important
role in insurance. Indeed, in classical theory the gains coalitions can obtain by cooperating
are assumed to be known with certainty. Recently, however, Suijs, Borm, De Waegenaere
and Tijs (1995) introduced a model, which overcomes this problem. They introduced
cooperative games, which allow that the gains coalitions can make are random variables.
This paper shows how the abovementioned game theoretical model can be applied to
examineproblemsininsurance. Themodelweintroduceincorporatesinsuranceofpersonal
losses as well asreinsuranceof the portfoliosof insurancecompanies. By cooperating with
insurance companies individual persons are able to transfer their future random losses to
the cooperating insurance companies. Thus, in doing so, individual persons conclude an
insurance deal. Similarly, by cooperating with other insurers an insurance company can
transfer (parts of) her insurance portfolio to the other insurers. So, the insurance company4
concludes a reinsurance deal.
In this model our attention is focused on Pareto optimal allocations of the risks, and
on the question which premiums are fair to charge for these risk exchanges. A Pareto
optimal allocation is such that there exists no other allocation which is better for all
persons and insurers taking part in the game. We show that there is essentially a unique
Pareto optimal allocation of risk. It will appear that this Pareto optimal allocation of the
risk is independent of the insurance premiums that are paid for these risk exchanges. For
determiningfairpremiums,welookat the’core’ofthereinsurancegame. Acoreallocation
divides the gains of cooperation in such a way that no subcoalition has an incentive to split
off. We show that the core is nonempty for insurance games. Moreover, we show that the
zeroutilityprincipleforcalculatingpremiums(seeGoovaerts, DeVylderandHaezendonck
(1984)) results in a core allocation.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we introduce insurance games. We
indicate which allocations are Pareto optimal and show that the core of reinsurance games
is nonempty. In particular, we provethat the zero utility principlefor calculating premiums
results in a core allocation. In Section 3 we use game theory to explain why subaddi-
tive premiums are attractive for insurance companies. Finally, Section 4 provides some
concluding remarks.
2 Insurance games
This section models insurance problems as cooperative games with stochastic payoffs as
introducedinSuijsetal. (1995). Weshowthat by cooperating,individualsand insurerscan
redistribute their risks and, consequently, improve their welfare. First, we need to specify
the players of the game. A player can be one of two types. A player is either an individual
person or an insurer. The set of individual persons is denoted by
N
P and the set of insurers
is denoted by
N






Next, all players areassumed to berisk averse expected utilitymaximizers. This means5
thataplayerprefersonerisktoanotheriftheexpectedutilityoftheﬁrstexceedstheexpected
utility of the latter. Note that insurers are also assumed to be risk averse. Furthermore,











































for the utility functions
u
i, we have that each player is risk averse. So, for each random
loss




) with certainty to
receiving the random loss
X. Moreover, the absolute measure of risk aversion for player
i
is constant and equals
￿
i. Hence, player











i the utility function becomes convex, and, as
a consequence, the player will be risk loving. Regarding the situations where one or more
risk neutral/lovinginsurers are involved we conﬁne ourselves to a brief discussion later on.
Finally, note that since the utility functions are exponential that the expected utility of a
random loss
X need not always exist. In this paper, however, we implicitly assume that the
risks are such that the expected utility exists.














gbe a ﬁnite collection of independent exponentially distributed
random variables. These variables can be interpreted as describing the random losses that
could occur to individuals. They describe, for example, the monetary damages caused by


















































P. So, if player
i is an insurer the loss
X
i represents the loss of insurer
i’s portfolio. Moreover, the insurance portfolio
X
i can be a combination of many random
losses. In fact, they are the fractions
f
i
k of the losses that individuals have insured at this
particular insurer. If player
i is an individual person then
X
i represents the random loss
this individual might want to insure. Note that the portfolios of different players may be
stochastically dependent, albeit in a very speciﬁc way. Indeed, an individual can insure
part of his loss at insurer
i and another part of the same loss at insurer
j.
Now, let us focus on the possibilities that occur when players decide to cooperate.6
Therefore, consider a coalition
S of players. If the members of





















i. Subsequently, the loss
X
S has to be allocated to the
members of
S.
In allocating the loss
X
S we distinguish the following three cases. In the ﬁrst case,
coalition




I. Such a coalition is assumed to allocate
the loss
X
S in the following way. First, a coalition















































1 . This is called proportional reinsurance. This part
of the allocation of
X
S for coalition








+ ,w h e r e
r
i
j represents the fraction insurer
i bears of insurer
j’s loss
X
j. Second, the insurers are
allowed to makedeterministictransferpayments. This means that each insurancecompany
i
2













0 . These transfer payments can
be interpreted as the aggregate premium insurers have to pay for the actual risk exchanges.
In the second case, coalition





the gains of cooperation are assumed to be nil. That is, we do not allow any risk exchanges
between the persons themselves. For, that is what the insurers are for in the ﬁrst place.






























j. If, however, one wants to allow
risk exchanges by the individual persons then the resulting situation is similar to the case
where only insurance companies cooperate. Consequently, allocations can be described in
the same way.
In the third and last case, coalition








P. Now cooperation can take place in two different ways. First, insurers
are allowed to exchange (parts of) their portfolios with other insurers. Second, individual
persons may transfer (parts of) their risks to insurers. Again, individual persons are not
allowed to exchange risks with each other. Moreover, we assume that insurers cannot
transfer (parts of) their portfolios to individuals.
Summarizing we can say that there a several restrictions on allocations. To be more
precise, denote by
S




































is feasible for the coalition

































































g. So, there are ﬁve
































































5. A feasible allocation for

















































































































































In conclusion, an insurance game




































),w h e r e
N
I is the set of insurers,
N










) the random loss for coalition
S,a n d
u
























P and that all playersare















2.1 Pareto optimal distributions of risk
Since the preferences of both an individual and an insurer are described by means of a
utility function we can look at the deterministic(or certainty) equivalent of random payoffs8
for each of them. The deterministic equivalent of a random payoff is the amount of money
for which a player is indifferent between receiving the random payoff and receiving this
amount of money with certainty. For the utility functions considered in our model, we can






















provided that the expected utility exists. Then for all these random payoffs






























). Since the expected utilities equal each other,
player
i is indifferent between the random payoff






Moreover, for the insurance games introduced in this section the deterministic equivalent
is such that the results stated in Suijs and Borm (1996) can be applied. One of their results
concerns the Pareto optimality































Pareto optimal for coalition


















































the sum of the deterministic equivalents. To determine these allocations, we ﬁrst need to

































































































) of the loss
X
S is Pareto optimalfor coalition









S such that each member of
























































































































































































































Hence the sum of deterministic equivalents is independent of the vector of transfer
payments















0 . Consequently, Pareto
optimality is solely determined by the choice of the allocation risk exchange matrix
R of
the random losses. In fact, the next theorem shows that there is a unique allocation risk
exchange matrix
R





































































































0 ,o t h e r w i s e
:
P ROOF: We have to show that
R



































































































































2The proof is stated in the Appendix.10
Since the objective function is strictly concave in
r
i





S, it is sufﬁcient to prove that
R
￿ solves this maximization problem. The Karush-
Kuhn-Tucker conditions




























































































































































































































￿ solves the maximization problem.
2
So, for a Pareto optimal allocationof a loss
X
j within
S one has to distinguish between
two cases. In the ﬁrst case the index
j refers to an insurer and in the second case
j
refers to an individual. When
X








i among all insurers in coalition
S. When
X




P, the loss is allocated proportionally to
1
￿
i among all insurers in coalition
S and
individual
j himself. Note that by the feasibility constraints nothing is allocated to the






















































































































L) are convex thenthereverse ofthestatement also
holds and the maximum is unique.11
other individuals. Moreover, the less risk averse a player is, the larger his share in the















; then the Pareto optimal allocation coincides with the Pareto
optimal allocation of (re)insurance markets discussed in B¨ uhlmann (1980).
Example 2.4 In this example all monetary amounts can be assumed to be in thousands
of dollars. Consider the following situation in automobile insurance with three insurance































































5, respectively. So insurer
2 is theleast riskaverse player
and individual
4 is themost riskaverse player. Each insurancecompany bearstherisk of all
the cars contained in its insurance portfolio. A car can be one of two types. The ﬁrst type
corresponds to an average saloon car which generates relatively low losses. The second
type corresponds to an exclusive sportscar generating relatively high losses. Formally, the




) when it is of type





) when it is of type
2. Thus the expected loss of
a type
1 car and a type










0 cars of type
1 and
1
0 cars of type
2. For insurer
2 the portfolio consists of
9
0
0 cars of type
1 and
2






0 cars of type
1 and
9




















0. The expected losses for insurer
2 and






0, respectively. The two individual persons each possess
one car. Player
4’s car is of type
1 and player
5’s car is of type








i denote the loss of player
i. If all players cooperate, the Pareto optimal risk








































































































































































































































































The determination of the allocation risk exchange matrix is, of course, only one part
of the allocation. We still have to determine the vector of transfer payments
d, that is, the






) may be Pareto optimal for
any choice of
d, not every
d is satisfactory from a social point of view. An insurer will not
agree with insuring the losses of other players if he is not properly compensated, that is, if
he does not receive a fair premium for the insurance. Similarly, insurance companies and
individuals only agree to insure their losses if the premium they have to pay is reasonable.
Consequently, there is a conﬂict of interests; both insurance companies and individuals
want to pay a low premium for insuring their own losses, while insurance companies want
to receive a high premium for bearing the losses of other players. So the question remains
which premiums are reasonable? This is the subject of the next subsection.13
2.2 The core of insurance games
In our quest for fair premiums we look at core allocations of insurance games. The core
is one of the most important solution concepts in game theory. It is generally accepted by
gametheorists that if thecore is a nonempty set of allocations, then the allocation on which
the players agree should be a core allocation. The core contains allocations that induce a
form of stability for the coalition of all players involved. For a more general discussion of
thecorewerefertoAumann (1961)andScarf (1967). Inthecontext of insurancegames, an






P because this subcoalition can acheive a better allocation on their
















































































































that the allocation risk exchange matrix
R has the structure of the Pareto optimal allocation
risk exchange matrix
R














P which is stable in the sense described above. To prove this result,
we make use of the results stated in Suijs and Borm (1996).























)with deterministic payoffs. This means that the payoff of a coalition
in the game
￿
￿ is a real number instead of a random variable. The game
￿













S in the game
￿


































S is based on Proposition 2.2, which states that an allocation is Pareto optimal
for







































) . The following






































































































So, to prove nonemptiness of the core of insurance games it is sufﬁcient to prove that






























































































P. The Bondareva Shapley Theorem applied to insurance games then reads as


































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































where the inequality follows from Lemma A.1 with
c
=


























P. Applying Proposition 2.5 and Propo-
sition 2.6 then completes the proof.
2
Example 2.8 Consider the situation described in Example 2.4. In order to calculate the




































































































































































Similarly, one can calculate the value
x
S for each coalition





























































































































































































































































































































































































































TABLE I: The deterministic equivalent
￿
￿.














































































































































































































































































). It is easy18


















So, since the core is nonempty, we know that if all players cooperate then there exist
allocations such that this cooperation is stable. Moreover, from the Pareto optimality of a
core allocation it follows that the allocation risk matrix is uniquely determined. A similar
argument,however,doesnotholdforthealloctiontransferpayments(i.e., thepremiumsthat
haveto bepaid). Sincethenumberofcoreallocationswillmostly beinﬁnite,thenumberof
premiumsresultingina coreallocationwill alsobe inﬁnite. Consequently, theinsurers still
have to agree on the premiums that have to be paid. A possibility is considering existing
premium calculation principles and check if they result in core allocations for insurance
games. This approach is elaborated in the next subsection.
2.3 The zero utility principle
Premiumcalculationprinciplesindicatehowtodeterminethepremiumforacertainrisk. In
the past, variousof these principlesweredesigned, for example, the net premium principle,
the expected value principle, the standard deviation principle, the Esscher principle, and
the zero utility principle (cf. Goovaerts, De Vylder and Haezendonck (1984)). In this







i for bearing the risk







X such that the utility level of individual














X.S i n c e





























). Note that the premium of the risk
X depends on the
individual who bears this risk and his wealth
w
i.
Now, let us return to insurance games and utilize the zero utility principle to determine









P. At ﬁrst this might seem difﬁcult since
the zero utility principle requires initial wealths
w
i which do not appear in our model
of insurance games. The assumption of constant absolute risk aversion, however, yields
that the zero utility principle is independent of these initial wealths
w























































































































) which indeed is independent of the
wealth
w
i. Given this expression we can calculate the premium individuals receive for the







































































0 ,o t h e r w i s e
:















j. The premium heshould



















































































































































































































































). As a consequence, we let the premium that
insurer








the premium that insurer







































































Then the premium insurer








































P has to pay for insuring his loss at insurer


























































Because individualsare not allowed to bear (partof) therisk of any other individual/insurer


















































































































































































































































































































































Example 2.9 Consider again the situation described in Example 2.4. Applying the zero












































































































































































































































































































































































































































)is in the core of the game.
In Example 2.9 it is seen that the allocation corresponding to the zero utility principle














0 is the vector of transfer payments determined
bythezeroutilitypremiumcalculationprincipleand
R

















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Example 2.11 Consider the insurance game introduced in Example 2.4. Now, let us take
a closer look at the changes in insurer








In the initial situation insurer
1 bears the risk
X























































To allocate the total risk in a Pareto optimal way, insurer





















) determined by the zero































1’s welfare does not change when he
insures a part of the risk of insurer
2. A similar argument holds when he insures a part of
















































































The increase in insurer












































































































































The situation described in the example above is subsistent in the deﬁnition of the zero
utility principle. This means that the welfare of an insurer always remains the same when
he bears the risk of someone else in exchange for the zero utility principle based premium.
An increase in welfare only arises when he transfers (a part of) his own risk to someone
else. Consequently, the insurers’ welfare does not increase when individuals insure their
losses. Hence, the insurers’ incentives to insure the individuals’ losses is low. To increase
these incentivesit may bebetter to utilizeother premiumcalculation principles. Onecould,
for example, consider subadditive premiums. In the next section we give another reason
why it could be desirable that insurance companies employ subadditive premiums.
3 Subbaditivity for collective insurances
In theinsurancegames deﬁned in theprevioussection individualpersons arenot allowed to
cooperate;theycannotredistributetheriskamongstthemselves. Lookingattheindividuals’
behaviour in everyday life, this is a justiﬁed assumption. People who want to insure
themselves against certain risks do so by contacting insurance companies, pension funds
etc. We show, however, that when this restriction is abandoned then the mere fact that25
risk exchanges could takeplace between individualsimpliesthat insurancecompanieshave
incentives to employ subadditive premiums. Whether or not such risk exchanges actually







































S denotes the total loss of the coalition
S. So, it is attractive for the individuals to
take a collective insurance, since this reduces the total premium they have to pay.
Next, consider a game with player set
N
P only where the individuals are allowed










). So, the individuals
N






























































































S. For this game, the value
x
S can be interpreted as the maximum premium
coalition
S wants to pay for the insurance of the total risk
X
S. To see this, suppose that the
coalition
S can insure the loss
X





) that exceeds the valuation of the
risk
X













































































































































































Hence, the members of

















). Consequently, they will not pay more for the insurance of the26
risk
X
S than the amount
￿
x







































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































; and the inequaltiyfollows



















































































































Recall that insurers do not beneﬁt from insuring the risks of the individuals when
utilizing the additive zero utility principle; this premium calculation principle yields the
lowest premium for which insurers still want to exchange risks with the individuals (cf.
Example 2.11). So, from a social point of view, it might be best to adopt a middle course
and look for premiums where both insurers and individuals beneﬁt from the insurance
transaction. Interesting questions then remaining are: are these premiums additive or
subadditive and do they yield core allocations?
4 Concluding Remarks
In this paper (re)insurance problems are modelled as cooperative games with stochastic
payoffs. In fact, we deﬁned a game that dealt with both the insurance and the reinsurance
problem simultaneously. We showed that there is only one allocation risk exchange matrix
yielding a Pareto optimal distribition of the losses and that a core allocation results when
insurance premiums are calculated according to the zero utility principle. Moreover, we
explained why subadditive premium calculation principles might be attractive to use for
insurance companies.
An issue only brieﬂy mentioned in this paper concerns the insurers’ behaviour. What
if an insurer is risk neutral or risk loving instead of risk averse? Thus, there is at least

























0. Although the proofs are not provided here, most of the results presented
in this paper still hold for these situations. This means that the corresponding games have
nonempty cores and that the zero utility principle still yields a core allocation. The result28
that does change is the Pareto optimal allocation of the risk. The allocations that are Pareto
optimal when all insurers are risk averse are not Paretooptimal anymorewhen one or more
insurers happen to be risk loving. In fact, they are the worst possible allocations of the
risk one can think of. In that case, allocating all the risk to the most risk loving insurer
is Pareto optimal. This would actually mean that only one insurance company is needed,
since other insurance companies will ultimately reinsure their complete portfolios at this
most risk loving insurer.
We conclude with some topics for further research. Maybe most interesting is consid-
ering problems in ‘life’-insurance instead of ‘non life’-insurance, which was the subject
of this research. Other topics concern the premium calculation principles: are there other
premiumcalculationprinciplesthanthezeroutilityprinciplethat result incoreallocations?


























f is a non decreasing function in
x.


















































































































































































































1it is sufﬁcient to prove that
f is non increasing in
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